In his recent best seller “The God Delusion”, Richard Dawkins seems to understand his “ultimate Boeing 747 argument” (henceforth, the “UBA”) as an argument against God’s existence. I think, however, that it is best understood as a refutation of an argument for God’s existence—namely, the design argument. If so, and if the design argument is the only argument for God’s existence which has prima facie plausibility, then the UBA is an argument against God’s existence only in so far as showing that we don’t have reason to believe that x exists is showing that we have reason to believe that x doesn’t exist (which is probably pretty far).
Here is how Plantinga (in his review) seems to think the UBA goes:
P1) Any being capable of designing and creating the world as we know it is as at least as complex and organized as the world as we know it.
P2) If God exists, then God designed and created the world.
From (P1) and (P2) it follows that
C1) If God exists, then God is at least as complex and organized at the world as we know it.
Now we add two more premises
P3) The world is extremely complex and organized.
P4) The probability of a things existence is inversely proportional to its level of complexity and organization.
From (C1), (P3), and (P4) it follows that
C2) The probability of God’s existence is extremely low.
I believe Plantinga is wrong in his interpretation of the UBA. Instead I propose the following. The only premise is a logical truth:
P1*) If all complex and organized things have designers that are as complex and organized as they are, then if God exists, he has a designer that is as complex and organized as he is.
which entails
C1*) It is either false that all complex and organized things have designers that are as complex and organized as they are or that God exists or that God does not have a designer that is as complex and organized as he is.
Now, (C2*), by the transitivity of the “as complex and organized as” relation, entails
C3*) It is either false that all complex and organized things have designers that are as complex and organized as they are or that God exists or that God is the creator of the world, or that God does not have a designer that is as complex and organized as the world is.
which entails
C4*) It is either false that A) all complex and organized things have designers that are as complex and organized as they are or that B) God exists or that C) God is the creator of the world, or that D) the world is highly complex and organized or that E) God does not have a designer that is as highly complex and organized as the world is.
Since (A) and (D) are premises of the design argument, B) is the conclusion of the design argument, C) is either a premise or an implication of one of the premises of the design argument and D) is something nearly everyone who has ever given the design argument is unwilling to give it up, we seem to have here a refutation of the design argument.
The version of the design argument I have in mind is something like:
1) All complex and organized things have designers that are as complex and organized as they are.
2) The world is highly complex and organized.
3) Therefore, the world has a highly complex and organized designer (from 1 and 2).
4) Therefore, God exists.
No one since Aquinas has been able to see how to from (3) to (4), but however one does it, (C) will either turn out to be a premise or an implication of one of the premises.
Of course, the more popular versions of the design argument are inductive, where (1) is no longer taken as a premise, but, rather, a (basic or derived) principle of inductive reasoning. Things would be a bit more complicated, but I can’t see any reason why we couldn’t create a version of the UBA as I’ve presented it above which is equally a refutation of the inductive version. The basic idea of the UBA can be put in the form of a rhetorical question: if you think that the complexity and organization of the world is reason to postulate the existence of a complex and organized creator, why don’t you think that the existence of the complex and organized creator is reason to postulate the existence of another complex and organized creator? If you answer, “Because God doesn’t need one”, then we ask, “Then why does the world?”
On a side note, didn’t Hume already say all this?
On another side note, is anyone as upset as I am by the fact that Plantinga opens his review of “The God Delusion” by saying that “Richard Dawkins is not pleased with God”? Could there be a more shameless attempt to get one’s (Christian) audience on one’s (anti-Dawkins) side? Seriously, this really bothers me. Could someone offer me a more charitable interpretation of what Plantinga is up to there?
